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ABSTRACT  
Previous design research has demonstrated how epistemic uncertainty engenders localized, creative 
reasoning, including analogizing and mental simulation. We analyzed not just the short-term, localized 
effects of epistemic uncertainty on creative processing and information selection, but also its long-term 
impact on downstream creative processes. Our hypothesis was that heightened levels of uncertainty 
associated with a particular cognitive referent would engender: (1) immediate creative elaboration of that 
referent aimed at resolving uncertainty and determining information selection; and (2) subsequent attentive 
returns to that cognitive referent at later points in time, aimed at resolving lingering uncertainty and 
determining information selection. Findings: First – contrary to expectations – we observed that increased 
epistemic certainty (rather than increased epistemic uncertainty) in relation to cognitive referents triggered 
immediate, creative reasoning and information elaboration. Second, epistemic uncertainty was, as predicted, 
found to engender subsequent attentive returns to cognitive referents. Third, although epistemic uncertainty 
did not predict the selection of information, both immediate creative elaboration and subsequent attentive 
returns did predict information selection, with subsequent attentive returns being the stronger predictor. Our 
findings hold promise for identifying more global impacts of epistemic uncertainty on creative design 
cognition possibly mediated through the establishment of lasting associations with cognitive referents. 
 
Keywords: epistemic uncertainty, design cognition, creativity, cross-cultural interpretation, 
metacognition 
 
  
1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
It is essential that the design process incorporates knowledge of end-users through user-oriented 
approaches such as anthropological investigations, user-driven design and participatory design. 
However, understanding users, especially across cultural divides, is a daunting task, as many a 
failed design artifact illustrates. Although cross-cultural interpretation can be a source of design 
error and failure, we suggest that it can also act as a catalyst for creative design. That is, because 
cross-cultural interpretation is frequently uncertain, ambiguous, re-frameable, contextually shiftable 
and open to exploration, it embodies the essential qualities that provide design objects and pre-
inventive structures with creative potential, as captured by dominant theories of design and 
creativity (e.g., Dorst & Cross, 2001; Finke, Ward & Smith, 1995; Schön & Wiggins, 1992). 
Indeed, much design-reasoning research has convincingly demonstrated that effective designers are 
not only at ease with uncertainty but thrive in relation to the opportunities it affords (Alcaide-
Marzal, Diego-Más, Asensio-Cuesta, & Piqueras-Fiszman, 2013; McDonnell, 2015; Schön, 1983).  
A few previous studies have addressed the importance of uncertainty in design, although not with a 
focus on cross-cultural interpretation. Beheshti (1993) discussed uncertainty as a key factor 
influencing design decisions, noting that it is important to minimize its influence so as to increase 
decision quality. We likewise see uncertainty as a pervasive aspect of design and view it positively 
since it provides valuable opportunities for creative ideation as part of the process of uncertainty 
reduction. Designers also view uncertainty as a positive element of their professional self-identity, 
as shown in Tracey and Hutchinson’s (2016) qualitative study of designers who were prompted to 
reflect on their experiences and beliefs regarding uncertainty. D’souza and Dastmalchi (2017) 
discuss uncertainty in design jargon and slang usage, while Paletz, Sumer, and Miron-Spektor 
(2017) relate uncertainty to design team micro-conflicts.  
Our current analysis of made use of ethnographic design data stemming from the Design Thinking 
Research Symposium 11 (Christensen, Ball & Halskov, 2017), and focused on the extent to which 
uncertainty arising specifically from cross-cultural interpretation elicits creative design reasoning – 
both in the short-term (e.g., engendering localized analogizing and mental simulation) and in the 
longer-term (influencing downstream creative processes and decision-making). To address this 
issue we examined those parts of the dataset that involved the Scandinavian design team 
comprehending and analyzing a large set of lead-user generated post-it notes written in Chinese. 
Our overarching assumption was that uncertainties in the interpretation of these post-it notes (pre-
inventive structures) would be likely to promote creative processes and subsequent returns to 
information, eventually predicting what information would be extracted by the team to be taken 
forward. 
 
1.1 Epistemic Uncertainty as a Metacognitive Trigger for Creative Analysis 
 
The concept of uncertainty that we draw upon for our analysis is that of ‘epistemic uncertainty’, 
which refers to a designer’s experienced, subjective and fluctuating feelings of confidence in their 
knowledge and choices, as measured through phrases in the design dialogue. This epistemic 
uncertainty is differentiable from ‘aleatory uncertainty’, which is expressed in natural language via 
likelihood statements (Ülkümen, Fox, & Malle, 2016). Heightened levels of epistemic uncertainty 
appear to act as a ‘metacognitive cue’ (Ackerman & Thompson, 2014; Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; 
Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007; Ball & Stupple, 2016; Thompson, Prowse Turner & 
Pennycook, 2011; Thompson et al., 2013), triggering more elaborate reasoning than might 
otherwise arise when people feel confident about ongoing processing. Similar ideas are noted by 
Stempfle and Badke-Schaub (2002) in a study of design-team thinking that coded for expressions of 
uncertainty. Their findings suggest that simpler design problems are associated with team self-
efficacy and rapid and intuitive evaluative reasoning, whereas complex design problems may 
trigger a shift toward a structured process of effortful idea generation and analysis.   
Epistemic uncertainty has previously been associated with creative analogizing (e.g., Dunbar, 1997; 
Houghton, 1998) and mental simulation (e.g., Nersessian, 2009). Indeed, spikes in expressed 
uncertainty reliably predict analogizing in engineering design (Ball & Christensen, 2009) and 
scientific problem solving (Chan, Paletz & Schunn, 2012), with these studies demonstrating that 
analogizing subsequently reduces uncertainty to baseline levels. Similarly, mental simulations 
during design have been found to be run in situations of elevated epistemic uncertainty (Ball & 
Christensen, 2009; Ball, Onarheim, & Christensen, 2010; Christensen & Schunn, 2009) and 
function strategically to reduce uncertainty through the generation of approximate answers to design 
issues. In addition, strategic switches between depth-first and breadth-first design moves have been 
shown to be mediated by epistemic uncertainty (Ball, Onarheim, & Christensen, 2010) and episodes 
of problem–solution co-evolution also take place under elevated levels of epistemic uncertainty 
(Wiltschnig, Christensen, & Ball (2013), with solution attempts within these episodes being closely 
associated with uncertainty above baseline levels.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
The underpinning assumption in these aforementioned studies is that a heightened level of 
epistemic uncertainty immediately sparks off a localized, creative episode (e.g., involving 
analogizing) aimed at reducing uncertainty. However, what has not been investigated is the degree 
to which increased epistemic uncertainty might also affect design across episodes that extend 
beyond the localized micro-situation in which it is experienced. No doubt the failure to address this 
research question reflects the methodological challenge of tracing uncertainty referents over time in 
naturally-occurring design dialogue. Answering this question requires shifting the unit of analysis 
from standard, sequential discourse segmentation (e.g., turn-taking in dialogue) to a focus on the 
qualities of the cognitive referents themselves, tracing their occurrence both locally (within micro-
episodes) and globally (across episodes).  
In our analysis we sought to address head-on the question of whether the epistemic uncertainty 
initially associated with a cognitive referent predicts repeated referrals back to that referent. This 
might arise from designers utilizing information that is generated or encountered later in the design 
process in an attempt to address an earlier, epistemically-uncertain design issue that remains 
unresolved. A similar phenomenon is found in the classic literature on the function of memory in 
problem solving and concerns the ‘Zeigarnik effect’ (Zeigarnik, 1927), whereby people’s memory 
for unsolved problems exceeds that for solved problems, indicating a special ‘cognitive alertness’ 
towards unanswered issues. This cognitive alertness might enable later, chance encounters with 
relevant stimuli to engender productive solution attempts (Christensen & Schunn, 2005; Seifert et 
al., 1995; Yaniv & Meyer, 1987) according to what has been termed the ‘prepared mind 
hypothesis’. This idea is central to the ‘opportunistic assimilation’ theory of incubation effects, 
where incubation is the phenomenon whereby a period of time away from a problem and engaged in 
unrelated activities leads to enhanced solution likelihood on returning to the problem (Howard et 
al., 2008; Sio & Ormerod, 2009; Gilhooly, in press).  
In light of these past findings we propose that it is theoretically plausible that epistemic uncertainty 
will become associated with its cognitive referent (the object of the uncertainty) so as to influence 
the design situation at later stages that are temporally remote from the original occurrence of the 
uncertainty. In our current analysis, epistemic uncertainty was estimated based on the initial 
translation and elaboration of post-its by the design team. We then examined whether the team 
spent time immediately on local, creative elaboration on a post-it and on whether (and to what 
degree) the team turned its attention to the post-it at a later time. 
 
1.3 Hypotheses 
 
We hypothesized that elevated levels of epistemic uncertainty would predict local, creative 
processing (XM1; Figure 1) as well as returns to the cognitive referent over time (XM2), as per 
the Zeigarnik effect. We also predicted that both the local, creative micro-episodes and the 
subsequent returns would predict which information was salient to the team and worth taking 
forward. In sum, we propose an overarching ‘double mediation model’ (Figure 1) in which 
epistemic uncertainty (X; independent variable) on initial encounters with individual post-its 
predicts: (1) the immediate occurrence of local, creative micro-episodes (M1; mediator) that 
mediate the formation of new post-its (information selection, Y; dependent variable); and (2) the 
occurrence of subsequent attentive returns across episodes (M2; mediator) that also lead to the 
formation of new post-its (information selection, Y). 
 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Figure 1. The proposed double mediation model 
 
Past research investigating epistemic uncertainty in design has focused on the triggering of creative 
processes. In the present analysis, however, it was also possible to trace the immediate and delayed 
outcomes of creative processes on the information selected to be taken forward. The focus was, 
therefore, specifically on whether the epistemic uncertainty in the initial encounter with the 
cognitive referent (i.e., a post-it or group of post-its) would affect both within-episode and between-
episode creative cognition and information selection.  
 
2. METHODS 
We analyzed an extensive video-based dataset that was collected for the purpose of the Design 
Thinking Research Symposium 11 (Christensen, Ball & Halskov, 2017), tracing a Scandinavian 
design team for 4 months, working for a European car manufacturer in designing, conducting , and 
analyzing co-creation sessions with Chinese lead-users.  We applied ‘in vivo’ analysis (Christensen 
& Ball, 2014; Dunbar, 1995) to the dataset, which involves studying expertise ‘online’ as it arises 
naturally. The in vivo methodology takes a particular stance on data analysis, with verbal data 
(including data from team discussions) being coded using a similar approach to that deployed when 
analyzing concurrent think-aloud protocols (Ericsson & Simon, 1999). 
 
2.1 Video Selection and Protocol Coding 
 
We selected Videos 15-17 (Christensen & Abildgaard, 2017) since these related to the design team 
translating into English the post-its that had been written by Chinese lead-users, with the designers 
sometimes elaborating on these post-its and generating new ideas. The team members subsequently 
noted down (on new post-its) selected information to take forward. The observed activity clearly 
involved more than straightforward translation between languages since it also included rich, 
inferential processes, with the designers mapping across information, making generalizations, 
deriving cultural meaning and extending information into design ideas. Moreover, for the designers, 
the process of deciphering what lead-users ‘meant’ was fraught with uncertainty. The dataset 
therefore provided a unique testbed for addressing our research questions regarding the impact of 
epistemic uncertainty on design cognition both within and across episodes.  
The selected videos had been recorded back-to-back over a single day, thus varying minimally in 
temporal factors that might have influenced the design process. In the videos, the Scandinavian 
design team had finalized co-creation workshops with Chinese lead-users, and then spent 
approximately 109 minutes going through the Chinese lead-user post-its, moderated by consultants 
capable of translating the information. The post-its thus supported design team cognition (Dove et 
al., 2017) Essentially, these sessions constituted iterations of Chinese post-it translations that 
resulted in some of the translated information being developed by the design team, with the 
information being selected and documented in English on separate posters to be taken forward. 
 
2.1.1 Coding cognitive referral segments and cognitive referral episodes 
 
The videos were transcribed and segmented by turn-taking of dialogue, resulting in 999 segments. 
To trace post-it usage and development, all post-its were numbered and categorized according to the 
poster and poster sub-section they were situated on and when they were added and moved. The 
data-segments were subsequently sub-divided by coding for post-it referral using gesture and 
dialogue. When a member of the design team referenced a post-it this was coded as a ‘cognitive 
referral’ in the associated dialogue segment, and whenever a segment contained mentions of more 
than one post-it referent, that segment was subdivided to ensure unique cognitive referents for each 
segment. This re-segmentation procedure resulted in 1158 segments.  
Based on the coding of cognitive referral relating to post-its we then coded for ‘cognitive referral 
episodes’, which reflected clusters of segments pertaining to the same Chinese post-it or post-it 
cluster. This led to 89 episodes. Individual episode-segments contained translations of a post-it 
together with further elaborative comments aimed at trying to understand its meaning (e.g., by 
referencing Chinese cultural or contextual information). These cognitive referral episodes 
constituted our final unit of analysis. 
 
2.1.2 Coding epistemic uncertainty 
 
The coding for epistemic uncertainty followed the coding scheme used extensively in past research 
(e.g., Ball & Christensen, 2009; Chan & Schunn, 2012; Christensen & Schunn, 2009; Trickett et al, 
2005). It involved a syntactic approach whereby ‘hedge words’ are used to locate segments 
displaying uncertainty (e.g., ‘probably’, ‘sort of’, ‘guess’, ‘maybe’, ‘possibly’, ‘don’t know’, 
‘[don’t] think’, ‘[not] certain’ and ‘believe’). Segments containing these words were located and 
coded as ‘uncertainty present’ if it was clear from manual screening that the hedge words were not 
being stated as politeness markers or were otherwise not evidence of epistemic uncertainty. All 
instances of epistemic uncertainty were counted for each cognitive referral episode. Given the 
cognitive referral episodes contained multiple segments, the measure of epistemic uncertainty was a 
continuous one calculated by dividing the number of epistemically uncertain statements by the 
number of episode segments. 
 
2.1.3 Coding immediate creative elaboration 
 
Protocol segments that immediately followed a cognitive referral episode were coded for whether 
they revealed further generative and creative development of the episode content beyond what was 
derivable from the cognitive referent (e.g., analogizing, idea generation and old-new information 
synthesis). Segments were coded in a binary manner as ‘immediate creative elaboration present’ 
versus ‘immediate creative elaboration absent’. 
  
2.1.4 Coding subsequent attentive returns to the cognitive referent  
 
To measure subsequent attentive returns to a cognitive referent we tabulated the number of 
segments referring back to each cognitive referent. We then conducted a mean-split to divide the 
episodes into ones with many subsequent attentive returns versus few subsequent attentive returns. 
 
2.1.5 Coding information selection 
 
Based on the cognitive referral code, all new post-it generation was related to the episodes, allowing 
for an analysis of which Chinese post-its were linked to the resulting English outcome post-its that 
would be taken forward by the team. The information selection contained a mixture of notes from 
the translation, contextual information and further creative elaborations. When counted by episode, 
this led to a dependent variable that was a cumulative count of the number of outcome post-its 
deriving from each episode. 
 
2.2 Coding Procedure and Inter-Coder Reliability Checks 
 
The dataset was coded by two independent student coders who were unaware of the research 
hypotheses. Each student coded the dataset in four iterations. One coder carried out all post-it 
categorization, cognitive referral numbering and coding for cognitive referrals, cognitive referral 
episodes, immediate creative elaboration and information selection. The other student coded for 
epistemic uncertainty and subsequent attentive returns. The first coder had assisted in the 
transcription and turn-taking segmentation of the sessions, and was therefore familiar with the 
content of the cognitive referents and the overall data.  
Inter-coder reliability checks were conducted by asking a third coder to independently re-code 10% 
of the data, with reliability being estimated using Cohen’s Kappa. All Kappa coefficients displayed 
fair-to-good or excellent inter-coder agreement (epistemic uncertainty = .79; immediate creative 
elaboration = .83; subsequent attentive returns = .75; information selection = .58). 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
3.1 Descriptive Findings 
 
A total of 173 Chinese post-its formed the basis for the design team’s translation, elaboration and 
generation activities. Eighty-nine unique cognitive referral episodes were identified, constituting 
64% of the data segments. These unique episodes were the basic unit of analysis, ranging in length 
from 1-49 segments (M = 8.4, SD = 7.4). They contained an average of 0.46 epistemic uncertainty 
phrases per segment (SD = 0.48, Range = 0-2). Overall, 26% of all segments contained uncertainty 
phrases, which is a high percentage compared to past research, with around 15% of segments 
containing epistemic uncertainty being more typical (Ball & Christensen, 2009; Wiltschnig et al., 
2013). Such elevated levels of epistemic uncertainty perhaps derive from the inherent ambiguities 
associated with the translational and cross-cultural aspects of the present design situation. Segments 
arising within cognitive referral episodes contained uncertainty hedge words more frequently than 
segments arising outside of cognitive referral episodes (2(1) = 9.19, p = .002). However, 
uncertainty hedge words did not differ between segments arising within cognitive referral episodes 
and segments that immediately followed cognitive referral episodes (2(1) = 0.63, ns). Our analysis 
indicated that 35% of episodes were immediately followed (vs. not followed) by creative 
elaborative segments, and 55% of the episodes had many (vs. few) subsequent attentive returns.    
The design team made 85 notes relating to information selection, with 6 being clearly marked as 
‘categorical’ post-its describing clusters of other post-its. The latter were excluded from the 
analysis, resulting in 79 post-its, 58 of which were coded as having been generated in reference to 
prior cognitive referral episodes. The post-it count by cognitive referral episode displayed a Poisson 
distribution, with 50, 25, 11, 2, 0, 1 counts of 0-1-2-3-4-5 resulting post-its generated on their basis 
respectively (i.e., the majority of the notes were written with reference to a single episode). In 7 
instances information was subsequently added to an existing post-it upon initial production. This 
adding of information mainly happened as a result of the later classification of the notes and was 
ignored for the present purposes. 
 
3.2 Mediation Analyses 
 
The binary codes for [M1] immediate creative elaboration and [M2] subsequent attentive returns 
were statistically unrelated (2(1) = 0.75, p = .39) illustrating independence of the hypothesized 
mediators, and further indicating that multicollinearity was not a concern in the subsequent 
regression models. To test the hypothesized relations we followed Baron and Kenny’s (1986) step-
based procedure for testing mediation effects. It should be noted, however, that because of the 
different types of dependent variables in our analysis (binary for M1 and M2; Poisson distributed 
for Y), it was not possible to quantify the level of the direct effect versus the indirect mediation 
effect since distinct statistical tests were applied for testing individual relations (i.e., logistic 
regression for the relation between [X] epistemic uncertainty and the mediators [a, b]; GzLM 
Poisson regression for the relations between mediators [a, b] and [X] epistemic uncertainty on [Y] 
information selection). As a result, the model test here should be considered as being primarily 
conceptual rather than a precise quantification of the direct and indirect effects. In all models we 
controlled for the video session the episodes derived from.  
Step1[XY] Epistemic uncertainty and information selection 
A GzLM Poisson regression was run to test whether the level of epistemic uncertainty in the initial 
encounter with a cognitive referent predicted subsequent information selection. Overall, the model 
displayed acceptable goodness of fit (2/df = 1.003). However, the analysis revealed that epistemic 
uncertainty did not predict information selection, although the odds ratio of 1.39 (95% CI, 0.87 to 
2.23), p = .17, was in the expected direction. This analysis suggests the absence of a direct effect of 
epistemic uncertainty on eventual information selection. 
Step2 [XM1] Epistemic uncertainty and immediate creative elaboration  
A logistic regression was conducted to test whether the level of epistemic uncertainty in a cognitive 
referral episode predicted immediate creative elaboration. Overall the model was significant (2(3) 
= 12.09, p = .007, Nagelkerke R2 = .18), but epistemic uncertainty did not predict immediate 
creative elaboration (p = .141), and with an odds ratio of 0.44 the results go in the opposite direction 
hypothesized (i.e., less uncertainty predicts immediate creative elaboration).  
Step2 [XM2] Epistemic uncertainty and subsequent attentive returns  
A logistic regression analysis was conducted to test whether the level of epistemic uncertainty in an 
episode predicted subsequent attentive returns. Overall the model was significant (2(3) = 12.05, p 
= .007, Nagelkerke R2 = .17), with epistemic uncertainty significantly predicting subsequent 
attentive returns in the expected direction (p = .046), and with an odds ratio of 2.90.  
Step 3 [M1+XY] Immediate creative elaboration and epistemic uncertainty onto information selection  
A GzLM Poisson regression was run to predict information selection based on epistemic 
uncertainty in the initial encounter with the cognitive referent and immediate creative elaboration. 
Overall the model displayed acceptable goodness of fit (2/df = 0.88). Immediate creative 
elaboration predicted information selection, odds ratio of 0.52 (95% CI, 0.30 to 0.90, p = .019), in 
the expected direction. Epistemic uncertainty approached, but did not reach, significance, odds ratio 
1.61 (95% CI, 0.97 to 2.67, p = .067). 
 
Step 3 [M2+XY] Subsequent attentive returns and epistemic uncertainty onto information selection  
A GzLM Poisson regression was run to predict information selection based on epistemic 
uncertainty in the initial encounter with the cognitive referent and subsequent attentive returns. 
Overall the model displayed acceptable goodness of fit (2/df = 0.93). Subsequent attentive returns 
predicted information selection, odds ratio of 0.48 (95% CI, 0.27 to 0.83, p = .009), in the expected 
direction. Epistemic uncertainty did not reach significance, odds ratio 1.19 (95% CI, 0.73 to 1.97, p 
= .485) 
Step 3 [M1+M2+XY] Both mediators and epistemic uncertainty onto information selection  
A GzLM model combining both mediators and epistemic uncertainty further illustrated that only 
subsequent attentive returns significantly predicted information selection (odds ratio: 0.54; 95% CI, 
0.30 to 0.97, p = .038), while both immediate creative elaboration (odds ratio: 0.62; 95% CI, 0.35 to 
1.10, p = .100) and epistemic uncertainty (odds ratio: 1.36; 95% CI, 0.80 to 2.31, p = .262) were 
insignificant. 
 
3.2 Interpreting the Statistical Model 
 
Interpreting these results requires caution, since it was not possible to test for mediation using the 
same statistical test throughout given the Poisson-distributed outcome variable. As such, we were 
unable to calculate the direct versus indirect effects, but instead rely on interpreting the overall 
relations between the variables based on individual test results. Nonetheless, with appropriate 
caution the illustrated relations can best be described as approximating an ‘opposing mediation’, 
whereby the independent variable holds opposing relations to two distinct mediators that 
subsequently both positively affect the dependent variable (Figure 2). In opposing mediation the 
independent variable does not predict the dependent variable directly since the two mediators 
operate in opposite directions. In other words, high epistemic uncertainty triggers subsequent 
returns to the cognitive referent, while immediate creative elaboration is associated with epistemic 
certainty (although not reaching significance, and against the hypothesized direction based on past 
research). Both mediators positively affected information selection, with subsequent attentive 
returns proving to be the stronger predictor. Notably, epistemic uncertainty in itself does not 
significantly predict eventual information selection. In order to understand these patterns of effects 
in the dataset we present below extended, illustrative examples of the two ‘routes’ from epistemic 
uncertainty to information selection.  
 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Figure 2. The suggested opposing mediation model arising from the analyses 
 
3.3 Qualitative Examples of the Two Routes from Epistemic Uncertainty to Information Selection 
 
3.3.1 Example of high uncertainty leading to subsequent attentive returns and information selection  
 
Table 1 exemplifies how an episode with high uncertainty leads to subsequent attentive returns 
across episodes and ultimately to information selection. We enter the dialogue during a discussion 
about features for wearable devices connected to online services (Figure 3). In this fragment the 
post-its denoting ‘Personal aspect’, ‘Human’, and ‘2-way interaction’ (information selection; Figure 
4) are produced in response to Episode 40, which is related to the cognitive referent ‘Interaction’. 
The dialogue begins with Rose recalling an observation from the co-creation session. Rose refers, 
with high uncertainty (‘I think’ and ‘kind of’) to the analogy ‘the car as a boyfriend’ to explain 
product features like interaction and talking back to the user. Nina supplements Rose’s comments 
with her own observation that ‘it [the car/product] needs to be able to talk to you’. Rose confirms 
what Nina states in a way that links the ‘talk’ feature to the post-it ‘Interaction’ by saying ‘Yeah, 
that kind of interaction’ and using an air-quote gesture while saying the word ‘interaction’, 
implying that the word (or idea) belongs to the lead-users (Stivers & Sidnell, 2005). Abby sums up 
what Rose said and writes ‘Personal aspect’ on a post-it. Kenny proposes with high uncertainty (‘I 
think’, ‘it might’, ‘it could’, ‘maybe’) that preferences might differ from person-to-person, which is 
confirmed by Tiffany (‘mhh’) and Abby (‘yeah’ followed by ‘exactly’). Kenny repeats the word 
‘interaction’, while drawing attention to the post-it and gesturing towards himself ‘this has a 
relation to me’. Abby adds the text ‘Different kinds of interaction’ to the note. The episode is 
characterised by a high degree of uncertainty when Rose and Kenny talk, followed by repetitions 
and confirming utterances, which provides a display of understanding by the others. 
In the next episode (Episode 41), Abby completes the post-it note. Nina refers to a statement by one 
of the lead users and again Rose validates her observations; Rose points at a Chinese post-it with 
the English text ‘Alarm’ two times using air-quote gestures while saying ‘Alarm’. She explains the 
‘interaction feature’ of the product using the Chinese post-it note ‘Alarm’ as a reference point, 
several times looking and pointing while she elaborates on what the lead-users meant during the co-
creation session. Abby condenses the dialogue about product features (the alarm and push 
notifications) to ‘Talk’ as a finalizing remark and places the post-it next to another that also 
contains information on product features and services.  
 
 
Rose and Tiffany then open a new episode (Episode 42) by referencing a new Chinese post-it 
‘Home doctor’, and continue to talk about this service feature, while Abby writes another post-it 
with the word ‘Human’  (Figure 4), linking back to Episode 40. At the end of Table 1 Kenny writes 
‘2-way interaction’ on a post-it, which he sticks onto the bottom of the post-it that Abby previously 
wrote with the text ‘Different kind of interaction’. Kenny’s note can be linked to the topic of the 
product’s interaction features from Episode 40, but its content also links to the post-it notes Abby 
placed on the wall: a ‘Human’ or ‘Personal aspect’ of a service, meaning a two-way interaction.  
Overall, this example illustrates how uncertain dialogue is followed by subsequent attentive returns 
across episodes to the cognitive referent ‘interaction’, resulting finally in three new information 
selection post-its being produced. 
 
 
  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
Figure 3. Setting (Video 15 at 39:14) 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
Figure 4. Post-it notes based on Episode 40 
Table 1. Transcript Extract (Video 15, 227-238, run time 37:58) 
  Episode Post-It reference 
Rose I think this: reminded me of last week in the group, when we talked about (.) yeah I can't really remember what 
the context was, but some- >about< the car as a boyfriend ehm: (.) I don't really remember, right, but the car as 
a boyfriend >an interesting thing< but if I had bad day: I would like to be able to talk to my car and then the car 
is able to emphasize with me like a boyfriend  [>that sort of thing<] and then- so I think that was what she was 
really getting at like that kind of like interaction 
Episode 40 
Interaction 
(Chinese Post-It) 
Interaction; 
Personal  family; 
Personal data 
Tiffany                                                                                                                                         [mhh] ((nods))  
Nina and also in- >they said that it needs to be able to talk< (.) talk to you.   
Rose Yeah (.) that kind of ‘interaction’ ((does an air quote gesture and looks at post-it wall)) Interaction 
Abby so it's (.) >I guess it’s< more the personal (.), personal- yeah- personal (.) aspect or::?  
((begins to write ‘Personal Aspect’ on post-it note))  
 
Kenny yeah because I- I think it’s eh: it might be different from person to person how they wanted to realize (.) so, it 
could be she wanted to (.) to talk to you ((looks at Abby )) 
 
Kenny but other people would be maybe intimidated [by the car talking to you ((looks at Tiffany)) so they would prefer 
different] kinds of interaction 
 
Tiffany                                                                         [mhh]  
Abby                                                                         [yeah] 
(.) exactly 
 
Rose [mhh yeah but] ther- there is k- >some kind of<interaction I think that was what Interaction 
Nina  [yeah but, yeah bec-]  
Kenny mhh ((nods)) like the person  [interaction that] makes you feel like- that this has (.)a relation to me-  
Rose                                                [yes]  
Abby ((begins to write ‘Different kinds of interaction’ on the same note))  
Nina yeah because that other guy said that he wants to be able to display it, and the other guy- if you don't wanna 
display it it sends you a report (..) 
Episode 41 
Alarm 
(Chinese Post-It) 
 
Rose yeah (..) that was the: real time ((points and taps at Post-It Alarm’ with pen)) -whether you have regular or 
pushed notifications (.) or that you would look at at the same [time (.) so] 
Alarm 
Kenny                                                                                                                  [mhh mhh]  
Rose (.) I think (.) that they had ((points at Post-It ‘Alarm’ with pen)) >she was talking about< if they can provide 
you with push notifications like your REGULAR REPORTS (.) and then >at the same time< you would be 
looking at it ((touches her wrist)), but it would also: ehm: give me an ‘alarm’ (.) ((does an air quote gesture))  
[or like] you know 
Alarm 
Kenny                                   [mhhh] ((nods))                                     
Abby ((writes ‘talk’ and places post-it note on wall))  
Rose if something needs to- it's, >I guess, I guess< it is the thing that now most (.) a- mobile product that, like if you 
need to:: when is the time to go to >you know< your car to workshop for [a repair for example, right] 
 
Kenny                                                                                                                                 [mhh mhh]((nods))  
Rose if they: they let you know these- this information, but beyond that what other kinds of information can you 
provide for the- 
 
Tiffany yeah, they also mentioned that eh: it needs to be like internet based, and also have access to doctors or receipts 
if they don't trust the information, they can come to locals 
Episode 42 
Home Doctor 
(Chinese Post-It) 
 
Rose ((looks at Post-It wall)) ((nods)) Home Doctor 
Abby ((writes ‘HUMAN’ and places Post-It on wall)) Interaction 
Rose [yeah I think that-]  
Tiffany   [and that] you can adapt also to: eh to the car  
Rose yeah to the car >exactly< ((nods))  
Tiffany access to eh:: European [eh: (..)] specialists or whatever Interaction 
Kenny ((writes ‘2-way interaction’))  
Rose yeah ((nods)) I think this is good ((looks at Post-it wall))  
 
Note: Extract showing how low uncertainty triggers immediate cognitive elaboration and information selection.  
Epistemic uncertainty hedge words are underlined and information extraction is in boldface. 
 
 
3.3.2 Example of high certainty leading to immediate creative elaboration and information 
selection 
 
This example is taken 3 minutes after the previous example. Episode 44 begins with Abby uttering 
an observation relating to the earlier co-creation session and the fact that the lead-users mentioned a 
‘Life time companion’. While Abby is talking and gesturing towards the Chinese post-it notes Rose 
is confirming her observations by pointing at the Chinese post-it with the translation ‘Sustainable, 
lifelong’. Abby utters that ‘this is exactly what we need to create’, which both Tiffany and Rose 
agree with. Rose repeats Abby’s statement ‘exactly’ in a manner that expresses no uncertainty 
(unlike the uncertainty hedge words in the previous episodes). Tiffany then goes on to confirm 
Abby’s statement, adding that someone else also talked about this. The approving utterances 
illustrate that Abby’s statement has solid grounding in the group. Rose finalizes the mutual 
decision; she asks Abby to write the point down.  
Tiffany continues to share her observations of what the lead-users mentioned, while Abby is writing 
‘Life time companion’ on the post-it (Figure 5). Abby completes the post-it and fixes it to the wall, 
illustrating a shared representation. The group expresses excitement and certainty about the ‘Life 
time companion’ concept. Abby has ‘ideas popping out’ and Kenny finds it to be ‘an awesome 
concept’. Abby says that ‘it’s so obvious’ and ‘of course’, also expressing certainty on the matter. 
Tiffany adds that it is in fact something that ‘they’ (i.e. THE COMPANY) do already, which, even 
though the idea is not new, validates the concept further. In the last part of Episode 44 Rose begins 
to elaborate on the ‘Life time companion’ concept. Abby adds another post-it at the end of the 
episode, further elaborating on the idea (‘Get attached to the service, -> continue to buy 
(COMPANY), the product’).   
The example illustrates how agreement and certainty within the dialogue are followed by immediate 
creative elaboration in the same episode, resulting finally in two new information selection post-its 
being produced.   
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Figure 5. Post-it note 
 
 
  
 
Table 2. Transcript Extract (Video 15, 262-268, run time 42:49) 
  Episode Post-It reference 
Abby I'm thinking that this: whole thing about the lifetime eh: companion ((looks at Post-It wall and does circles with 
her right hand)) and we want to make sure that (.) that you can get the service ((moves both arms in front of 
herself and gestures towards Post-It wall on her right))  
Episode 44 
Sustainable, 
lifelong 
(Chinese Post-It) 
Sustainable, lifelong 
Rose ((looks at Abby, turns to point and tap at Chinese Post-It ‘Sustainable, lifelong’)) 
Abby and so on, I mean this is exactly [what] we want to create  
Tiffany                                                      [yes]  
Abby so they’ll buy a COMPANY PRODUCT again [so it's kind of our company], and then you have all the 
accessories (.) (INAUDIBLE) 
 
Tiffany [yeah (.) yeah (.) yeah]  
Rose yeah! exactly   
Abby it's- it’s really eh: it’s like  
Tiffany and they talk about with the (.) eh the workers-  
Abby Yeah  
Rose mhhh I think you should write that life time companion ((points at Abby))   
Abby ((writes post-it note ‘Life time companion’)) (1.1 sec pause)  
Tiffany it was also here they mentioned the:: lifetime companion to manage everybody's health so- they talked about 
that (.) and connected life and health, and health to life (.) 
Life time 
companion 
Kenny ((moves towards Abby and look at her writing on the Post-It))   
 (off task behaviour)   
Abby ((places Post-It on wall))  
(2.1 sec pause) 
 Life time 
companion 
Abby there's so many stories- a lot is popping out in my head already and it is (.) it is eh   
Kenny be an awesome concept for: (.) several products and services    
Rose mhh ((nods and looks at Post-It))  
Abby and it's so obvious that the eh: I mean, and that's also what I think we'll hear when we come back, just kind of 
what we heard a little bit from Phase I (..) kind of (..) yeah okay, kind of (.() we- we kind of knew this, but 
nothing has happened (..)  
Life-time 
companion 
Tiffany Yeah  
Abby because it is kind of obvious, of course we want them to get into the whole ((does circles with her right hand)) 
COMPANY story and to buy it again and do the whole thing 
 
Tiffany mhh but we are doing a lot of stuff already [it’s something already been done]  
Abby [then it] just doesn’t (.) for yeah:  
Rose yeah I think that people- I guess that if you could like somehow marked the same things as like the life 
companion ((points at Post-It)) actually maybe it's the accessories beyond the car. Because if we are ((points at 
Post-It)) if you want to buy the accessory of the service then you have to choice to kind of buy the car rather 
that buying the car and then thinking about what you want, but if you are tied to the service ((gestures and looks 
towards English Post-It’s)) (.) so  like if I'm so used to using an I-clock for example I have no choice but, but to 
continually buy an IPhone because I have no choice but I get- 
Episode 44 
Sustainable, 
lifelong 
(Chinese Post-It) 
Life time 
companion 
Abby mhh ((nods)) exactly (.) yeah and I guess, I mean ((turns to Tiffany)) THE COMPANY on call [is one thing] 
that is going on back the way 
 
Rose [yeah that how one-]  
Tiffany [yeah, yes]  
Abby yeah exactly  
Kenny It’s the accessory stuff   
Abby ((Writes post-it note ‘Get attached to the service, -> continue to buy (COMPANY), the product))  Get attached to the 
service 
Note: Extract showing how low uncertainty triggers immediate cognitive elaboration and information selection.  
Epistemic uncertainty hedge words are underlined and information extraction is in boldface. 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
Previous research on epistemic uncertainty in design has focused on how such uncertainty triggers 
localized, creative reasoning such as analogizing and mental simulation aimed at uncertainty 
reduction (Ball & Christensen, 2009; Ball, et al., 2010; Christensen & Schunn, 2007, 2009; 
Wiltschnig et al., 2013). To date, however, no research has examined how epistemic uncertainty 
may also affect design behaviors beyond the localized micro-episode in which it is experienced, 
although phenomena such as the Zeigarnik effect (Zeigarnik, 1927), where people’s memory for 
unsolved problems exceeds that for solved problems, suggests that designers may be alert to 
unresolved issues. The temporally-extended nature of the DTRS11 dataset afforded a unique 
opportunity to address this gap in existing knowledge through a direct test of the impact of 
epistemic uncertainty on creative design cognition both within and across episodes. 
In analyzing the dataset for evidence of an association between epistemic uncertainty and creative 
design cognition we decided not to focus on analogizing and mental simulation, since these 
strategies were not particularly in evidence. Instead, we examined how the level of epistemic 
uncertainty associated with a cognitive referent predicts the repeated referral back to that referent in 
subsequent dialogue. In the present dataset such cognitive referents took the form of the post-it 
notes deriving from Chinese lead-users. Our analysis was driven by the dual hypotheses that 
increased uncertainty associated with a cognitive referent would engender: (1) immediate creative 
elaboration of that referent aimed at resolving uncertainty and determining information selection; 
and (2) subsequent attentive returns to that cognitive referent aimed at resolving lingering 
uncertainty and again determining information selection. In sum, we proposed a ‘double mediation 
model’ (Figure 1) in which epistemic uncertainty on the initial encounter with an individual post-it 
predicts both the immediate occurrence of local, creative micro-episodes that mediate the formation 
of new post-its (information selection) as well as the occurrence of subsequent attentive returns 
across episodes that also mediate the formation of new post-its (further information selection). 
Our results challenge some aspects of our a priori assumption that the uncertainty associated with 
cognitive referents (post-its) would predict localized, creative elaboration and subsequent attentive 
returns, with both types of creative activities mediating eventual information selection. First, it was 
apparent that increased epistemic uncertainty in relation to cognitive referents did not immediately 
trigger creative cognitive events. Instead, it was epistemic certainty in relation to cognitive referents 
that engendered immediate, creative reasoning and information elaboration. In accounting for this 
opposite-to-predicted effect we speculate that uncertainty might have been so highly elevated in the 
present design context as almost to force the design team to opt strategically to make the most of 
any certain information at hand, immediately latching onto this and utilizing it as a way to establish 
a stable framework for subsequent work. Achieving a stable framework might be especially critical 
in design tasks that involve having to respond to end-user knowledge, where it is important to 
commence with some certainties as a foundation to build upon. In this way it is possible that 
epistemic uncertainty triggers a ‘metacognitive switch’ that is highly bounded by the prevailing 
context. If epistemic uncertainly is felt to be uniformly high then designers may opt to work 
creatively in the immediate term with information that feels more certain, whereas if uncertainty 
shows greater fluctuation then designers may opt to expend more immediate effort on resolving 
uncertain aspects of the design.   
The idea of epistemic uncertainty driving a metacognitive switch mechanism is gaining credibility 
in the literature on human reasoning (e.g., Ackerman & Thompson, 2014; Ball & Stupple, 2016; 
Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2013). Interestingly, too, it is becoming increasingly clear 
that the strategic decisions people make on the basis of metacognitive experiences are often 
determined by relative rather than absolute perceptions relating to perceived uncertainty (Wänke & 
Hansen, 2015). In other words, it appears that dynamic shifts from perceived certainty to perceived 
uncertainty are critical for determining strategic decisions about the kind of reasoning required at 
any particular point in time. These important conceptual ideas align well with our view that in some 
design contexts epistemic uncertainty may fluctuate extensively, with bouts of uncertainty leading 
to immediate, creative processing, whereas in other design contexts epistemic uncertainty may 
provide a more global and stable backdrop to ongoing activity, potentially leading to isolated 
moments of certainty triggering immediate creative processing, as observed here. It is noteworthy 
that in a post-study interview the leader of the design team spoke of his perception of post-its as 
‘emotional triggers’, evidencing an understanding that the emotional qualities of post-its could be a 
driver for subsequent design processes, although he did not specifically focus on epistemic 
uncertainty. 
A second key finding is that we have shown for the first time how epistemic uncertainty can 
promote subsequent attentive returns to a cognitive referent within the design process, since our 
analyses demonstrated a predicted correlation between initial, epistemic uncertainty that was linked 
to cognitive referents and such subsequent attentive returns. This finding corroborates our 
underpinning proposal that epistemic uncertainty may affect design behavior that extends beyond 
the localized micro-situation in which the uncertainty is experienced. The idea that epistemic 
uncertainty can have far-reaching consequences seems novel and important and would be worth 
exploring further.  
A third finding is that while epistemic uncertainty did not directly predict the information that was 
eventually selected, both immediate creative elaboration and subsequent attentive returns did 
predict information selection, with subsequent attentive returns being the stronger predictor. The 
fact that both mediator variables were predictive of information selection is interesting, although not 
surprising. In essence, this finding indicates that once designers have engaged in creative 
development activity in relation to a cognitive referent this activity then forms the basis of 
information selection for down-stream design work. Arguably, too, it might be expected that 
subsequent attentive returns would emerge as the stronger predictor of information selection 
compared to immediate creative elaboration given that the designers have presumably returned to 
unresolved issues because of their perceived importance for design success (i.e., the Zeigarnik 
effect may not only impact on memory for unresolved issues but may also impact information 
selection for subsequent processing).  
Before concluding, we note some caveats in relation to our findings, which primarily center on 
statistical issues. First, the small sample-size associated with our analysis will have reduced the 
reliability of our results. Second, we recognize the relatively small effect sizes arising from our 
analyses. Third, we reiterate the interpretative problems arising from our inability to test our 
proposed mediation model using the same regression methods because of the particular statistical 
properties of the variables underpinning the model. Our approach was to undertake a conceptual 
mediation analysis, although this didn’t allow us to formalize decisively the evidence for direct and 
mediated effects between predictor variables in relation to the dependent variable of information 
selection. Our interpretation of findings therefore needs to be treated with an appropriate degree of 
caution. That said, we contend that our approach and observations hold promise for identifying 
more pervasive and enduring impacts of epistemic uncertainty on creative design cognition that are 
potentially mediated through salient cognitive referents. In addition, our research contributes to a 
growing appreciation of uncertainty as a salient aspect of design that determines the dynamics of 
ongoing creative design reasoning and decision making (e.g., Stempfle & Badke-Schaub, 2002; 
Tracey & Hutchinson, 2016). 
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